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ABstRACt
This paper examines changes in Chinese high-tech SMEs’ access to both bank and informal finance 
in response to the institutional changes relating to the private sector and financial transactions. 
Using a theoretical framework based on institutional theory, the paper distinguishes between 
changes at different institutional levels and between formal and informal institutional arrange-
ments as they relate to the availability of business finance during the institutional transition over 
a period from 1998 to 2009.  The findings were based on a set of longitudinal datasets including 
two rounds of face to face interviews with the owners of high-tech SMEs and finance providers in 
the Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. It shows that the responses of high-tech SMEs 
and informal investors to the institutional changes have been more positive compared with those 
of banks. Consequently, access to informal sources of finance has grown, including to longer term 
equity finance, whereas that to bank finance has not significantly improved. The paper contrib-
utes to institutional theory by providing that the effects of the overall institutional framework on 
the optimal selection of formal and informal institutional arrangements to secure funding differ 
between types of finance provider and are not necessarily positively associated with the phases of 
the institutional transitions. 
intRoDuCtion
Investment in R&D and innovation for developing new technologies or new products has 
been widely recognised to be a key determinant in the long-term success of high-tech small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Acs and Audretsch, 1988, North and Smallbone, 2000). Yet 
emerging economies such as China often lack sufficient long-term investments necessary for 
developing such ventures because of the lack of institutional support (Xiao, 2011). The availability 
of relatively long-term loan and equity finance to SMEs requires fully developed legal structures 
and regulatory institutions. A lack of legal protection for the private sector leads to market uncer-
tainty and high regulatory variability (Peng and Luo, 2000, Wright et al., 2005), resulting in the 
preferences of both high-tech SMEs and informal investors for short-term investments. Informal 
investors are referred to in this study as those who provide financial support to SMEs and who 
typically are neither part of the regular management team of the SME nor related to any members 
of the management team. They are generally business people themselves who are looking to rein-
vest their profits in other SMEs.  
Traditionally, the financial regulations for the banking sector in China that focused on state-
owned companies resulted in local branches being reluctant to provide funding to SMEs. More 
recently, the institutional environment for high-tech SMEs and financial suppliers (e.g. the protec-
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tion of private property rights and incentives to the banking sector) has developed dramatically 
in China. However, little is known about the impact of these institutional changes on high tech 
SMEs’ access to both formal and informal finance sources as the regulatory institutions improve. 
This paper therefore presents the findings of a longitudinal study of the financing of high-tech 
SMEs in China and investigates changes in the nature of the relationship between such SMEs and 
both banks, as formal finance sources, and informal investors in response to restructuring of the 
institutional environment for entrepreneurial activities.  
In the studies of SME finance in developed countries there is a long-standing theoretical 
debate about the nature and existence of potential market failure relating to SMEs’ access to bank 
finance. This debate concentrates on two aspects of lending to SMEs: first, whether credit availabil-
ity to SMEs is affected by the existence of information asymmetries which arise because finance 
providers do not have perfect knowledge about the business, especially where assets are knowl-
edge-based and intangible as in many high-tech SMEs; and second, whether this is affected by the 
reputation that business owners have with different types of investors (Moore, 1994). Information 
asymmetries have been widely applied to explain why there will be insufficient credit available for 
all sound or lendable propositions in western economies where legal and financial institutions are 
more developed than in emerging economies. Lending decisions in western countries are primar-
ily determined by the personal guarantees and collateral provided by the borrower together with 
the lender’s assessment of the ability of the borrower to pay back the loan at a given interest rate. 
Insofar as insufficient credit is available for all sound or ‘bankable’ propositions (e.g. projects with 
an expected positive return), this has been argued to be due to informational asymmetries arising 
from conditions of imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
However, in sharp contrast to most developed countries, Chinese SMEs’ access to bank finance 
may be entirely due to the legal and regulatory institutions relating to finance suppliers and the 
private sector, which influence formal and informal arrangements to make loan decisions rather 
than secure finance (Shen et al., 2009, Tan et al., 2009). Rules for the banking sector in China had 
primarily focused on supporting state-owned companies, political factors (i.e. social security, etc.) 
and reducing non-performing loans rather than seeking efficiency and the profit motive (Allen et 
al., 2003). Traditionally, the banking sector did not have any interest in supporting SMEs because 
these firms had a private ownership structure. Contracts between SMEs and banks have been dif-
ficult to enforce was another reason for this market deficiency. Therefore, the nature and existence 
of potential financial market deficiency has been strongly influenced by the less-developed bank-
ing sector.  
The availability of loan and equity finance from individual investors may be again exclusively 
determined by the legal and regulatory institutions relevant to the private sector. The absence of 
legal protection of private property has made relatively long-term equity finance largely unpre-
dictable, leading to preferences of both high-tech SMEs and finance suppliers for short-term 
investments. The preferences may be shifted from short-term loan investments to relatively long-
term equity finance as the regulatory institutions improve.  Furthermore, the causes for limited 
demand for relatively long-term finance may be again influenced by the less protection for SMEs 
and informal investors. 
To overcome the problem associated with the unsuitability of previous theoretical frameworks 
to the Chinese context, a fresh perspective adopted by this study focuses on macro and micro levels 
of institutions drawing upon ideas from institutional theory. It examines how finance availabil-
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ity is influenced by the interaction between macro level regulatory institutions and micro level 
institutional arrangements adopted by banks and informal investors to secure finance.  Moreover, 
attempts to identify the institutional changes needed in order to finance investment in relatively 
long-term projects are crucial to the further growth and development of high-tech SMEs in the 
Chinese context. In this article, institutional theory has been used to extend the body of literature 
on how institutional changes have impacted on the ability of high-tech SMEs to access different 
sources of finance during improvements in fundamental institutions for SMEs and suppliers of 
finance. The use of institutional theory as a foundation also helps to explain effects of regulatory 
changes on the selection of formal and informal institutional arrangements to secure finance, 
and the role of institutional arrangements employed by financial suppliers in responding to the 
financial needs of high-tech SMEs.
This study contributes to the existing literature as follows: first it concentrates on changes 
to SMEs’ access to formal and informal finance during China’s institutional transition by using a 
longitudinal study; and second, it contributes to the application of institutional theory by explain-
ing how macro level regulations shape a set of formal and informal institutional arrangements 
adopted by financial suppliers to guide transactions. The paper aims to provide insights into the 
process of institutional change and how this has impacted on the availability of various sources 
of finance to high-tech SMEs. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. It initially outlines a 
theoretical framework about the access to finance for high-tech SMEs1 in the emerging economy 
of China before describing the research design and methods. The empirical results are then pre-
sented and analysed contrasting the two time periods over which the study was conducted prior to 
discussing the findings and their implications.
tHEoREtiCAL DEvELopmEnt AnD pRoposion
Institutional levels and formal and informal institutions
Williamson (1985) differentiated institutions, defined as “any form of constraints that human 
beings devise to shape human interaction” (North 1990, p.4), into three levels of social analysis 
namely the socially-embedded (e.g. norms, customs, traditions and religions), the macro (e.g. 
regulatory institutions), and the micro (e.g. institutional arrangements). The selection of institu-
tional arrangements to secure finance is typically influenced by culture, regulatory institutions, and 
the tangible and intangible assets available, all of which shape the relationships between SMEs and 
their financial suppliers. A supportive relationship requires fully developed regulatory institutions. 
It has been argued that regulatory institution changes affect culture slowly (Brint and Karabel, 
1991, DiMaggio, 1988), but may bring about the selection and utilisation of institutional arrange-
ments more quickly. This suggests that the institutional effect of culture on change in SMEs’ access 
to finance is likely to be considerable in the long-term, it is only likely to have changed gradually 
over the last ten years when the numbers of high-tech SMEs in China grew rapidly.  
At the macro level, the regulatory institutions that most influence access to finance include 
legal protection for private property, financial regulations for the banking sector, accounting sys-
tem practices, contractual enforcement mechanisms, and the cost of producing financial disclo-
sure documents.  A set of institutional arrangements between firms or individuals that govern 
exchanges between them is influenced by regulatory institutions in subtle but pervasive ways (Ang 
et al., 2000, Peng, 2003, Scott, 1995 and 2002). Regulatory institutions serve as foundations and the 
level of institutional development leads individuals and firms to select a set of formal and informal 
institutional arrangements to manage economic transactions (North, 1990, Scott, 2001).  
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Formal institutional arrangements are defined as written contractual arrangements govern-
ing exchanges between firms and/or individuals which are supposed to be legally enforceable by 
a third-party judicial body. In this study, formal institutional arrangements are typically formal 
financial documents representing the value of real estate property, other fixed assets, contracts 
signed by customers etc. required by finance suppliers such as banks to act as collateral to secure 
funding. Informal institutional arrangements are typically unwritten codes of conduct (North, 
1990, Hodgson, 2003), in this paper, incorporating personal knowledge of either owners or their 
family, knowledge of investee businesses, personal reputations of owners, and interpersonal trust 
used to judge the risk of loan and equity application.  
It has been found that informal institutional arrangements are widely used to guide entrepre-
neurial activities in emerging economies when the legal and regulatory institutions are dysfunc-
tional (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006). We argue there are various influences on the extent to which 
formal and informal institutional arrangements are employed in financial transactions. First, the 
utilisation of formal institutional arrangements to secure finance is associated with enforcement 
mechanisms since a weak legal system makes formal arrangements powerless and problematic 
when firms cannot pay back loans. The perceived difficulty in enforcing contracts means either 
less use of formal institutional arrangements or only accepting those (e.g. estate property) that 
are easier to enforce. Second, the costs of producing formal financial documents based on fixed 
assets owned by firms adds to the total cost of investment capital, leading to cheaper informal 
arrangements being employed. Third, the level of complexity of accounting system practices (e.g. 
asset evaluation) determines the ability of SMEs to amortise fixed assets and produce accurate 
formal financial documents. And finally, the tangible and intangible assets owned by SMEs reveal 
the ability of SMEs to provide collateral required by finance suppliers. As a result, the heavy depen-
dence on formal institutional arrangements to govern finance made funding less available to firms 
particularly in emerging economies where regulatory institutions are yet to be fully developed. It 
is the interplay of these factors which influence the combination of formal and informal institu-
tional arrangements used to shape investment finance. 
The formal and informal institutional arrangements used, as “the types of collateral”, direct 
various sources of finance towards entrepreneurial activities. The availability of various sources 
of finance is driven by the optimal selection of formal and informal institutional arrangements 
adopted by finance suppliers to secure loan and equity capital. A supportive relationship between 
SMEs and finance suppliers is built through a selection of formal and informal institutional 
arrangements. Access to finance can be increased when the types of collateral required by finance 
suppliers can be reasonably met by high-tech SMEs that intend to apply for external funding 
and conversely, the availability of various sources of finance to SMEs decreases when the types of 
securities required cannot be met by them. The following section discusses how high-tech SMEs’ 
access to bank and informal finance in particular is influenced by a set of formal and informal 
institutional arrangements which respond to changes in regulatory institutions. 
Institutional changes and previous research evidence
In the Chinese context, regulatory institutions have experienced fundamental and compre-
hensive changes throughout the country’s economic reforms since 1978 (Peng, 2000, Newman, 
2000). More specifically, the protections of private property, contract enforcement, and financial 
policies and regulations relating to the availability of financial resources to SMEs in general and 
high-tech SMEs in particular have been developing fundamentally over the last decade. The effects 
of a significantly improved institutional environment for the banking system and the private sec-
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tor could be increasing the number of investments secured by a wide range of formal institutional 
arrangements or an optimal combination of formal and informal ones,  thereby enhancing both 
the demand for and supply of relatively long-term finance in particular. 
Access to bank finance
Having considered theoretically the influence of institutional levels on the availability of 
finance to SMEs, we now consider the Chinese banking culture in support of the private sector 
by examining the history of firms’ access to bank finance through the phases of reform within 
the banking sector. In the 1980s, the availability of bank finance was primarily determined by 
the ownership structure of the business, such that the financial policies and regulations for the 
banking system were aimed at supporting state-owned companies (through the provision of either 
grants or loans), and emerging private businesses did not receive any support from the banks. The 
financial regulations during the 1990s focused on the reduction of non-performing loans with 
the intention of establishing banks as commercially viable operations. Then, from the late 1990s 
to 2004, banks began to attach less importance to the ownership structure of the enterprise and 
more importance to the role of real estate property as security for loans (Xiao, 2011). Employing 
real estate property (which had significantly increased in value) to secure bank finance was to 
reduce the level of risk involved in the exchanges and protect local bank branches against the pos-
sibility of fraud. The history shows that the issue of SMEs’ access to bank finance has been largely 
disregarded because of the targeted aims of the banks set by the financial ministry central bank. 
Thus the key considerations influencing a local bank’s selection of a combination of formal and 
informal arrangements to govern bank finance has been changing to reflect adjustments in the 
stated goals and business strategies of the banking sector defined by the Chinese authorities over 
time (Haveman, 1992). The recent bank goals set by the State have changed to encourage local 
branches to make more funding available to SMEs, which may be slow by the banks’ tradition 
of being reluctant to serve SMEs (Lu and Tao, 2010). This can be expected to have affected the 
perception and attitudes of Chinese small business owners toward raising bank finance, even to 
the extent of discouraging them from applying altogether (Kon and Storey, 2003).
A recent study focusing on bank size and SME lending in China found that the factors that 
determined banks’ lending to SMEs were institutional arrangements and the reward system for 
bank managers (Lin, 2007 and Shen et al., 2009). Well-intentioned changes in the financial policies 
and regulations for the banking system to shift from the reduction of non-performing loans to 
supporting the private sector have been made to enable greater access to bank finance for high-
tech SMEs since 2004. Governments at the provincial level introduced a reward system in 2006 by 
which local branches will receive rewards if they lend a significant amount of capital to SMEs. The 
State Council has given appropriate subsidies since 2007 to financial institutions to support those 
branches extending loans to small companies, as shown in Table 1. The newly introduced macro 
level financial policies and regulations are expected to guide bank managers to select a reasonable 
set of formal and informal institutional arrangements to secure loans, enhancing the ability of 
SMEs to obtain bank loans. This paper considers:  
Proposition 1a:  SMEs’ access to bank finance should be greater during the period between 
2004 and 2009 as a result of increasing regulatory or governmental support for the banking 
sector and the private sector;
Proposition 1b: a wider range of formal institutional arrangements and a combination of 
formal and informal ones (e.g. contracts signed by customers, reputation, trust, real estate 
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property, and other fixed assets) are more likely to have been employed by local bank branches 
after 2004 to make loan decisions in response to more supportive regulatory institutions. 
Access to informal sources of finance
In contrast to the banks, informal investors can be expected to rely on informal institutional 
arrangements such as relationship-based, personalised ones, helping build a closer relationship 
between SMEs and individual investors than that between SMEs and the banking sector (Peng, 
2003, Tsai, 2002, Xiao 2011). Informal investors in China have had an advanced relationship with 
SMEs in general and high-tech SMEs in particular and have been largely substituting for the bank-
ing sector, a substitution made possible by employing the informal institutional arrangements 
preferred by informal investors (Tsai, 2002). Informal sources tended to be small amounts and for 
a short-term, a pattern which differed substantially from that in developed market-oriented coun-
tries (Hitt et al., 2004, Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006, Scheela and Isidro, 2009). The distinctiveness 
of informal finance available to SMEs likely relates to the lack of a fully-developed institutional 
environment for the private sector that increased the risk of long-term investment in business 
activities. Previous empirical evidence demonstrates that economic institutions (e.g. protection 
of private property and contract enforcement) strongly influence entrepreneurial activities in the 
emerging economy of China (Lu and Tao, 2010). Both SMEs and informal investors look for envi-
ronments with a stable rule of law and an effective enforcement regime to facilitate and safeguard 
their investments and pursue long-term success in business (Cardis et al., 2001). However, the 
institutional environment for the private sector has lagged behind both SME development and 
the contribution of informal investors to entrepreneurial activities. Private businesses began to be 
legally recognised for the first time in 1988. Formal protection of private property was not offered 
until 2004, and the legal status of private lending institutions was not granted until 2007, as shown 
in Table 1. Taken together this indicates that a lack of legal structure and regulatory institutions for 
the private sector made SMEs and individual investors less confident in investing larger amounts 
of capital in relatively long-term projects.
The less developed and effective legal structure and regulatory institutions for the private sec-
tor leads to individual investors adopting informal institutional arrangements entirely (e.g. inves-
tor’s knowledge of investee businesses, trust between investee firms and investors, and the entre-
preneur’s reputation) to analyse loan suitability and to secure finance (Peng, 2003, Ramamurti, 
2000), as discussed earlier. This indicates that prior knowledge of the business and the entrepre-
neurs is likely to be very important, leading to informal investors investing in local businesses that 
they already know about. The willingness of informal investors to employ informal institutional 
arrangements links to two difficulties perceived by SMEs: to produce reliable formal financial 
documents representing properly-valued assets in the firm that will or can be used as collateral, 
and to enforce agreements/contracts signed by SMEs and their finance suppliers (Meyer, 2001). 
Informal institutional arrangements therefore become important collateral which overcome the 
absence of institutional structures (Peng, 2000, Tan et al., 2009) and play an important role in 
helping informal investors navigate the challenging environment with poor protection of private 
property and less enforcement of contracts (Butler et al, 2003, Peng, 2003, Hoang and Antoncic, 
2003). More recently, progress has been made to improve regulatory institutions for SMEs and 
informal investors and as a result, it is expected that informal investors will be encouraged to 
provide more support for the private sector. The improved legal environment enables SMEs and 
informal investors to reduce the risk of their relatively long-term investments, more investment 
capital from informal sources will thus be made available. We propose:
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Proposition 2a: informal sources of finance for short-term loan capital continued to be the 
dominant funding for high-tech SMEs during the period from 1998 to 2009.
Proposition 2b: the informal finance providers who had primarily offered debt finance over 
the period from 1998 to 2004 became the basis of an embryonic business angels and/or ven-
ture capital sector after 2004 and were more likely to provide longer-term equity capital to 
high-tech SMEs as a result of macro level institutional advancements.   
REsEARCH DEsign AnD mEtHoDs
This research addresses concerns the changes in the nature of finance available to high-tech 
SMEs and the formal and informal institutional arrangements relating to it during China’s insti-
tutional transition. A longitudinal study comprising two business surveys covering sequential 
time periods from 1998 to 2009 was employed to investigate this research issue. The surveys were 
conducted in 2004 and again in 2009. The first survey covered the period from 1998 to 2004 and 
the second focused on the period between 2004 and 2009. The choice of 2004 as the dividing line 
between the two surveys is that fundamental changes in the regulations for encouraging entrepre-
neurial activities and lending to SMEs have been introduced since 2004. Face to face interviews 
with the senior manager/owner of high-tech SMEs were undertaken to investigate in-depth how 
high-tech SMEs met their financial needs during the two time periods. Information on experi-
ences of raising finance, types and amounts of funding being sought, types of collateral provided 
to secure finance, purposes of raising finance, and reasons for the difficulties encountered was 
collected through the interviews. This provided an important empirical basis for identifying the 
availability of various sources of finance to high-tech SMEs and for detecting changes in finance 
supply during the two time periods. 
The 2004 survey
 The sample for the 2004 survey was stratified into three criteria: industrial sectors (electronic 
information technology (EIT) and bio-technology (Bio-tech)), business employment size (fewer 
than 250 employees), and location (two Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi). A sample 
of 129 high-tech SMEs that met the criteria, drawn from the sampling frames provided by govern-
ment agencies at the national level from four high-tech parks within the two selected provinces, 
was approached and invited to participate in a face to face interview in 2004. Interviews were suc-
cessfully conducted with 74 of these owner/senior managers in 2004, representing a response rate 
of 57 per cent. The interviews with the respondents lasted on average one hour and a follow-up 
telephone interview was conducted as well when additional information was required. The main 
reason for non-participation in the survey given by potential respondents was that they were too 
busy to afford time for an interview during the year 2004 of the survey. Table 2 provides a cross 
tabulation of the 2004 sample according to three development stages of the firm (See Xiao (2011) 
for details on the definitions of three stages) and geographical province. All 74 firms at the time of 
the 2004 survey were either at or previously experienced the start-up stage, whilst 65 firms were 
either at or previously experienced the early stage, with only 39 firms experiencing the later stage, 
and the average age of all 74 firms was four years old. 
The 2009 survey 
For the 2009 survey, a sub-sample of the firms participating in the 2004 survey was chosen 
comprising those firms that had survived and were willing to participate in a second face to face 
interview in 2009. In addition, 31 businesses from the 2004 sampling frames that met the original 
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selection criteria but were unable to participate in the 2004 survey were approached and invited 
to take part in the 2009 survey.  In the 2009 survey, there was no problem to collect information 
about the two time periods from the additional 11 firms contacted in the 2004 survey, although it 
was not really a ‘pure’ longitudinal study.
The 2009 survey started with an investigation of survival status of firms from the 2004 survey. 
For those respondents who changed contact details after the 2004 survey, information about either 
the survival status or updated contact details were again provided by the research assistants from 
government agencies. Table 2 shows that 77 per cent of the 2004 sample (i.e. 57 firms) were still 
operating in the market in 2009 and that the remaining 23 per cent had closed down. The failure 
rate was much higher for those that were at the start-up stage in 2004 than for those that were at 
the subsequent stages of development. About four firms had changed their ownership structure 
and eight had moved or were moving their premises. An interview with non-survivors was focused 
on the main reason for business failure; the most frequently identified  reasons were ‘conflicts 
between founder team members’, ‘failed to continually launch a new product’, ‘making a loss’, and 
‘a shortage of investment capital’. Of the 57 survivors from the 2004 survey interview, face to face 
interviews were successfully conducted with 50 of them, giving a response rate of 88 per cent. 
The reason given by the seven survivors who did not participate in the 2009 survey was that they 
thought that their businesses had just survived and not made fast-growth. About 11out of the 31 
additional high tech SMEs were interviewed in the 2009 survey, giving a response rate of 36 per 
cent. Table 3 provides a cross-tabulation of the samples according to survey year, geographical 
province, and structure of the 2009 sample. In total, 50 firms were successfully interviewed on two 
occasions in 2004 and 2009, and 35 firms were interviewed only once either in 2004 or in 2009. 
Agency information
 In addition to the longitudinal study of high-tech SMEs, in total 15 face to face interviews 
were conducted with finance suppliers, comprising four bank managers interviewed in 2004, two 
of them interviewed again in 2009, and nine informal finance suppliers interviewed in 2009. These 
interviews enabled this study to examine why a set of formal and informal institutional arrange-
ments to secure finance differed according to finance suppliers, as well as the views of finance 
suppliers on the provision of finance to SMEs in general.  
Data analysis
The quantitative data relating to what sources of external finance that SMEs sought and used 
in the two time periods were analysed, focusing on the subsequent stages of business development. 
The institutional arrangements required by the banks to secure a loan were also examined. More 
specifically, financial information about the 61 firms (including the 50 survivors from the first 
survey and the 11 “top-up” firms from the second survey) was analysed for comparability over 
the two study periods. The Wilcox test was then employed to examine for any significant differ-
ences in the high-tech SMEs access to both bank and informal finance before and after 2004. The 
detailed evidence on the micro-conditions around financing was used to corroborate the research 
findings. The qualitative data on the reasons why the sampled firms did not seek and accept bank 
finance and the motives why they were likely to cooperate with informal investors were coded 
for categories by the researcher who speaks both Chinese and English. The information collected 
was categorised into three aspects namely: availability and cost of formal institutional arrange-
ments; types of informal institutional arrangements; and financial strategies adopted by firms. 
The institutional arrangements required by finance suppliers to secure finance were first grouped 
into formal and informal ones. The results from the two time periods were compared to explain 
8
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how the availability of bank and informal finance to SMEs was influenced by institutional arrange-
ment changes, reflecting the improvement of the regulatory institutions. 
tHE finDings AnD tHE LongituDinAL stuDy
This section compares bank and informal sources of finance available to high-tech SMEs, 
and examines institutional arrangement effects on the availability of financial sources. Changes 
in institutional arrangements employed to govern finance were observed between the two time 
periods as macro level institutional conditions improved.  
Access to bank loans
The results does not support proposition 1a (the p-values of the Wilcox test were not at a 
statistically significant level) shown in Table 4. There is no evidence from the two interview surveys 
to indicate that SMEs’ access to bank loans was greater after 2004 than previously and this applies 
to enterprises at the subsequent development stages. Therefore bank finance has yet to become 
a major source of funding for high tech SMEs in China. Just 12 per cent of the firms founded 
before 2004 approached banks for finance at the start up stage, which was secured against state-
ownership structure. During the subsequent stages of business development, about 40 per cent of 
the firms in each study period actually approached banks for finance. However, the fact that the 
remaining 60 per cent did not intend to seek bank finance, even though many of them had real 
estate property, indicates that there has not been the greater use of bank finance that might have 
been expected. The findings also do indicate that whilst there was a slightly lower application rate 
after 2004 compared to that before 2004, there was a higher success rate in the second period. This 
higher success rate experienced in the post 2004 period probably reflects the greater ability of firms 
to obtain funding sources from somewhere else rather than the banks. 
The sampled firms that applied for a bank loan were asked what institutional arrangements 
bank managers required from them to secure finance in the 2004 survey and again in the 2009 
survey. The evidence shown in Table 5 demonstrates that Proposition 1b is not supported signifi-
cantly. At a detailed level, real estate property (82 per cent) has been the dominant formal arrange-
ment to secure bank loans, and other formal arrangements secured on fixed assets and contracts 
signed by customers were not widely employed. An interesting finding is that bank managers have 
begun using informal institutional arrangements (i.e. the reputation of firms) to judge loan appli-
cations in recent years, which was not the case prior to 2004. About four well performing firms in 
the second sample that invested ten million Yuan of the retained earnings and profits in purchas-
ing the use right of land and building up their plants obtained bank loans of several million Yuan 
for a one year term, which was secured primarily on their reputation. There was a subtle shift in 
emphasis from real estate property as collateral to a wide range of both formal and informal insti-
tutional arrangements in response to the macro-institutional changes that had occurred, although 
the change was not substantial. This may suggest that Chinese banks’ culture of being reluctant 
to support the private sector slowed the implementation of well-intentioned changes to improve 
high-tech SMEs’ access to bank finance. 
The firms that did not intend to approach banks for finance were asked what key factors 
stopped them from applying. The most frequent reason for not applying for bank finance given 
by the respondents in the first period was the inability to provide estate property as collateral, but 
in the later period the most common reason was the difficulty perceived by firms of producing 
formal financial documents accurately representing the value of property. The reasons for decid-
9
Xiao and North: Institutional Transition and Financing of High-Tech SMES in China
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2011
109finAncing
ing not to apply for bank finance shifted from an inability to provide collateral to the difficulty 
that SMEs perceived in producing the formal documents that banks required. Firms that needed 
short-term working capital preferred individual investors over banks, differing from firms in west-
ern countries where SMEs would invariably fund working capital through overdraft facilities with 
their banks. The most recent version of the Chinese property evaluation certificate was required 
by bank managers to obtain a loan, but this led to the actual cost of short-term finance becoming 
disproportionately expensive when only small amounts of funding were sought. All these suggest 
that the use of formal institutional arrangements secured on estate property did not make bank 
finance any more attractive to SMEs. 
Access to informal sources of finance
Propositions 2a and 2b are supported by the longitudinal evidence shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
There are indications from the survey evidence that informal investors are becoming the basis of 
an embryonic venture capital sector capable of providing the equity capital to high-tech SMEs that 
make longer-term investments. This is underpinned by the development of a more advanced rela-
tionship between high-tech SMEs and informal suppliers in recent years (p-values of Wilcox test 
shown in Column 6 of Tables 6 and 7). At a more detailed level, SMEs’ access to informal sources 
of finance has significantly increased over time (the proportion of the sample firms obtaining 
short-term loans from informal sources increased from 31 per cent before 2004 to 51 per cent after 
2004, p-value of 0.019 at a statistically significant level). 
The evidence from both time periods shows that loans from informal investors have con-
tinually met short-term financial difficulties facing SMEs from several days up to a maximum of 
several months. Institutional arrangements employed by informal investors have predominately 
been the informal ones (e.g. knowing owners and their families, knowing investee businesses, 
reputations of owners, and trust) rather than formal financial documents. Short-term credit thus 
became available for all sound and lendable propositions from informal sources of finance and 
frequently substituted for bank finance in both periods.  The findings demonstrate that greater 
access to loan capital from informal sources continued to be entirely based on the acceptance 
of informal institutional arrangements acting as security to shape transactions. Evidence from 
both interviewed SMEs and informal investors themselves demonstrates the high cost of informal 
finance (typically at an interest of .5 to 3.0 per cent per month) as a result of mainly employing 
informal arrangements to secure funding. Furthermore, the time taken to receive funding from 
informal investors was generally shorter than was the case with obtaining loans from the banks. 
More recently, obtaining equity finance from senior employees has become a means of keep-
ing highly skilled personnel motivated and invigorated as well as meeting long-term financial 
needs.  As shown in Table 6, 27 per cent of the sampled firms accepted equity finance from their 
employees over the period 2004 to 2009 compared to 5 per cent of the firms in the earlier period. 
It also appears that equity finance from other sources became more prevalent after 2004. As shown 
in Table 7, demand for equity finance from informal sources increased from 12 per cent to 35 per 
cent (p-value of 0.004 at a statistically significant level). The proportion of firms seeking and using 
equity finance from informal investors over the second period was much greater than that during 
the time 1998 to 2004. SMEs’ demand for external finance has shifted from a sole focus on short-
term loan investments for covering working capital to a greater emphasis on equity investments 
for acquiring expensive fixed assets. It suggests that both high-tech SMEs and informal suppliers 
were more confident of investing in long-term projects (up to five years) for business expansion 
because of the increased security provided by the State for their investments since 2004.  Moreover, 
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personal trust developed further through successful previous short-term investments in SMEs. 
In effect, therefore it would appear that these informal suppliers of finance to high-tech SMEs 
represent the beginnings of a nascent form of business angel (i.e. private investor) venture capital 
in China, although as yet not able to provide the long-term equity investments to support R&D 
and the knowledge and expertise that venture capitalists typically provide in western countries.  
Equity finance from informal investors was either tailored to the funding of specific projects 
or directed at buying a share of the business as a whole, as evident from the statements made by a 
number of respondents. An owner of an EIT firm in Shenzhen from the 2009 survey claimed: “I 
accepted four million Yuan of equity finance provided by a friend of mine through offering him 20 per 
cent of company’s shares in 2007.” The owner of a Guilin firm specialising in information system 
solutions from the 2009 survey stated: “we raised equity finance from informal investors whom we 
knew for years since 2005, were basing on a project or new division rather than company’ shares.” 
These examples show that informal institutional arrangements (e.g. trust and personal connec-
tions) play a critical role in providing equity investment capital to high-tech SMEs.  
DisCussions AnD impLiCAtions
The findings from the survey evidence spanning the two time periods have shown that the 
institutional effects on high-tech SMEs’ access to finance vary according to the suppliers of finance 
as the regulatory institutions improve. The development of the overall institutional framework 
contributes positively to the availability of long-term loan and equity finance from informal sources 
to SMEs. In contrast, the nature of the relationship between high-tech SMEs and banks continued 
to be unsupportive and uncertain across the time periods, whereas informal suppliers of finance 
were able to establish a much closer personal relationship with high-tech SMEs. Informal investors 
have generally acted as a substitute for formal financial providers and have started to play the role 
of small venture capitalists (or business angels) in supporting the development of high-tech SMEs. 
These differences between banks and informal investors appear to be consistent over time and if 
anything seem to be widening.  Moreover, there appears to have been little change in the prefer-
ence of the banks for serving state-owned companies rather than privately owned SMEs. This is 
evident from the statements made by two bank managers in Nanning and Guilin respectively from 
the 2009 survey, claiming that “the rewards from the provincial government have been much less than 
the profits made from providing sufficient amounts of bank finance to large companies.” The tradi-
tional attitudes of bank managers towards the private sector change very slowly and have held up 
the implementation of well-intentioned state policies to construct a more supportive relationship 
between SMEs and banks over the research study period.
In those instances where high-tech SMEs did seek bank finance, the institutional arrange-
ments employed by local bank branches to secure loans to SMEs have primarily been based on 
real estate properties. This was consistent over the two time periods. However, the difficulties in 
producing reliable formal financial documents based on fixed assets proved to be a significant 
constraint on the ability of firms to obtain bank loans after 2004: these difficulties included the 
cost of producing the documents, the time taken to produce them, and the lack of knowhow or 
advice on how to complete them.  Bank managers have continually thought that bank finance 
secured on formal arrangements (e.g. fixed equipments and contracts signed by customers) would 
be much more difficult to enforce when firms default without such documentation. Moreover, the 
actual costs to firms of producing formal financial documents (e.g. the most up-to-date certificate 
of property valuation) continued to be much higher than in more developed institutional envi-
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ronments. This indicates that progress made on Chinese financial policies and regulations for the 
banking system have so far failed to overcome these problems, such as better accounting system 
practices, contract enforcement required to make the banking system more accessible, and the 
construction of a supportive relationship between SMEs and the banking system.
Our evidence highlights the continual importance of informal sources of finance and informal 
investors to high-tech SMEs as the institutional environment improves. It suggests that informal sup-
pliers of finance have been providing a substitute financial infrastructure and have successfully moved 
from the provision of short-term loans before 2004 to meeting the financial needs for both short-term 
working capital and long-term equity investment after 2004. The institutional arrangements employed 
by informal suppliers of finance have made informal loan finance easier to access than bank finance. 
Informal institutional arrangements have continually substituted for formal ones to evaluate the suit-
ability of loan applications. The evolving trust between high-tech SMEs and informal investors that 
were based on personal knowledge and relationships reduced information asymmetries, leading to the 
willingness of informal investors to provide investment capital as the business develops. Improvements 
in private-sector protections have generated greater confidence between high-tech SMEs and informal 
investors, increasing demands for and supply of long-term equity investments. These findings tend 
to reinforce previous studies in showing informal arrangements to be crucial and effective strategies 
in emerging economies lacking fully developed institutions (Scheela and Isidro, 2009, Ahlstrom and 
Bruton, 2006, Peng and Heath, 1996).   
From a more theoretical perspective, the findings from this study provide new insights into 
the process of institutional change and its influence on the availability of various sources of finance 
to high-tech SMEs in emerging economies, showing that the institutional perspective appears to 
be very relevant in explaining SMEs’ access to finance under the absence of a well-developed insti-
tutional framework. This research has paid particular attention on the role institutional arrange-
ments play in governing transactions and access to external finance and how these arrangements 
relate to other institutional changes.  A particularly useful notion here has been that of institu-
tional levels first put forward by Williamson (1985). 
This article extends Peng’s (2003) work by showing the contrary findings that the importance 
of informal institutional arrangements to secure informal finance stayed broadly unchanged as 
regulatory institutions improve. It demonstrates that improvements of regulatory institutions did 
not make a move from a relationship-based, personalised transaction structure to a rule-based 
impersonal exchange regime. Our article argues the importance of informal institutional arrange-
ments to govern short-term finance would likely remain the same when the rise of more support-
ing regulatory institutions like overdraft facilities banks offer in developed counties. The effects of 
the overall institutional framework on the optimal selection of formal and informal arrangements 
to secure funding are thus not necessarily positively associated with the phases of the institu-
tional transitions. This study also extends earlier work (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006, Welter and 
Smallbone, 2008), demonstrating the regulatory institution effects of selecting arrangements to 
shape financial transactions differ, depending on the finance supplier. The link between the micro 
and macro levels could also be influenced by the institutional culture regarding the privately 
owned small enterprise sector. Thus the way informal investors have been responding to changes 
in regulatory institutions has differed from, and been much more positive compared to that of 
the banking sector. Informal investors have already adopted to a private sector culture, whereas 
the decision-making of banks is still heavily influenced by the culture associated with centralised 
control. Relying on informal institutional arrangements to shape short-term loans rather than 
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relatively long-term ones continues to be beneficial as the regulatory institutions improve. Relying 
on informal institutional arrangements makes equity investment capital more accessible when the 
regulatory institutions established. Our results thus suggest a necessity for scholars to conceptually 
differentiate term loan features and types of finance, particularly when conducting research over a 
period where there are fundamental institutional changes.
This study has identified the interaction between the level of the legal structure and regulatory 
institutions as well as the use of formal institutional arrangements. The lack of a fully-developed 
legal structure and regulatory institutions (e.g. accounting system practices and legal resources) 
makes it very challenging for financial suppliers to employ a wide range of formal institutional 
arrangements to secure their investments in SMEs.  The lack of fully-developed institutions also 
makes it very challenging for SMEs to produce reliable formal financial documents representing 
properly-valued assets in the firm that can be used as collateral. The efforts made by the Chinese 
State to improve regulatory institutions have so far failed to enhance the use of formal institutional 
arrangements to govern exchanges. The use of informal arrangements to secure funding is more 
appropriate for short-term loan and equity investment from informal resources even after the 
level of institutional support improves. This study found that the banking sector has failed to 
differentiate short-term and relatively long-term finance and secure them on a varying range of 
formal and informal institutional arrangements. This research has also discovered that improve-
ments in private-sector protections appear to be leading to increased levels of long-term equity 
investments. Overall, a closer relationship between SMEs and informal investors benefited from 
both a tradition of SMEs seeking external finance from informal sources and better securities for 
investment offered to the private sector.   
ConCLusions
This paper demonstrates how institutional changes matter in the crucial context of the avail-
ability of various sources of finance to high-tech SMEs in emerging economies such as China, 
depending on the finance suppliers. It was found that the responses of informal suppliers to the 
institutional changes (e.g. formal protection of private property and the legal status of private 
lending institutions) differed from those of the banks. Informal investors responded to the insti-
tutional changes more positively through shifting from a focus on short-term loan investments for 
covering working capital to an emphasis on equity capital for making longer-term investments. 
The reliance of informal investors on informal institutional arrangements with SMEs with which 
they had already fostered a close relationship remained largely unchanged throughout the two 
time periods. In contrast, the banks were slow to offer solutions to SMEs to meet their financial 
needs. The effects of the overall institutional framework on the availability of sources of finance to 
high-tech SMEs vary according to the cultural factors within finance provider.  Informal investors’ 
confidence has grown with regard to long-term investments amongst Chinese high-tech SMEs, 
responding to better investment protection offered to the private sector. Offering the protection 
of private property in particular lowered the risk and uncertainty of long-term investment in 
businesses across the private sector. From both the demand and supply sides, the investment pref-
erences have shifted from meeting financial needs for short-term working capital to satisfying 
longer-term capital needs directed at investing in fixed assets.  However, whilst access to informal 
sources of finance has grown, that to bank finance has not significantly improved in recent years. 
The establishment of regulatory institutions is clearly important, but there needs to be deeper 
seated and fundamental cultural changes within the banking sector itself before Chinese banks are 
likely to become more supportive of the formation and development of high-tech SMEs. 
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notEs
1.  High-tech SMEs in this study are from “high-tech industrial sectors”, following the definition 
of the China National Bureau.
2.  Only 52 out of the 61 firms in the first sample experienced subsequent stage of business 
development and the remaining were at the start-up stage during the period from the 1980s 
to 2004.
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Table 1:  Description of key events during transition
Year Key events
1995 The Central Bank introduced law to commercialize the operations of the four state-owned banks
1999
The asset management companies (AMC) were established to transfer the non-performing assets from the banks and sell them 
to the investors
2004
The Chinese constitution was further amended to ensure that the state protected the legal rights and interests of individual 
businesses and private enterprise and encouraged their development
2006 Government at provincial level began to offer rewards to local branches that lent a significant amount of capital to SMEs
2007 The decision was made by the State to allow the establishment of private lending companies
2008 The State Council will give appropriate subsidies to financial institutions to support them extending loans to small companies
Table 2: The 2004 sample and survival status in 2009 
2004 Survival status in 2009
Guangdong Guangxi Total Closed down Trading
No. No. No. No. % No. %
Start-up 4 5 9 6 67 3 33
Early stage 7 19 26 8 30 18 70
Later stage 21 18 39 4 10 35 91
Total 32 42 74 17 23 57 77
Table 3: The sample stratification for 2004 and 2009
Regions 2004 2009 Total interviews
Longitudinal New participant
Guangdong 32 20 6 58
Guangxi 42 30 5 77
Total 74 50 11 135
Table 4: Bank loans approached and obtained by period 
From 1998 to 2004 Between 2004 and 2009 p-value
No. % No. %
Start-up 
Total 74
Approached 9 12.2 - - -
Obtained 6 8.1 - - -
Success rate - 66.7 - - -
Subsequent stage
Total 523 61
Approached 22 42.3 24 38.8 0.7029
Obtained 17 32.6 23 35.8 0.9892
Success rate - 77.3 - 92.3 0.8892
Notes: statistically significant differences between two periods of time based on Wilcox test
Table 5: Institutional arrangements required by stage and period 
From 1998 to 2004 Between 2004 and 2009
Start-up No. % No. %
Supervisory agency Guarantee 6 100 - -
Subsequent stage
Real estate property 14 82 18 75
Contract signed by customer 1 6 1 4.5
Guarantee company 2 12 1 4.5
Reputation of firms 0 0 4 17
Table 6: Informal sources of finance obtained by type and sample period (at the subsequent stages)
From 1998 to 2004 Between 2004 and 2009 p-value
No. % No. %
Total 52 61
Loan from individuals 16 31 31 51 0.019
Loan from employees 12 23 2 3 0.000
Equity from employees 3 5 17 27 0.000
Notes: statistically significant differences between two periods of time based on Wilcox test
Table 7: Equity from informal investors by sample period 
From 1998 to 2004 Between 2004 and 2009 p-value
No. % No. %
Total 52 61
Approached 6 12 23 38 0.004
Obtained 4 8 16 26 0.039
Success rate - 67 - 69
Notes: statistically significant differences between two periods of time based on Wilcox test
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